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Neonaticide: Less Than Murder?
A nineteen year old, single woman silently gives birth to a child in the
bathroom of her parents' home, unknown to her boyfriend and her family. As
the woman has not acknowledged that she was pregnant, she has not prepared
for the birth of her child. Two days later, a dead baby is found in the trash,
wrapped in newspaper from the woman's home. The newborn baby's future
was decided by its mother; the mother's future is dependent on where the
crime took place.
Is the mother guilty of murder, or something less? What is the "right"
punishment for the killing of an innocent child? Does, and/or should it matter,
that the killing of the child may have taken place immediately after the
traumatic act of childbirth? This article investigates the crime of infanticide,
specifically neonaticide. Infanticide is the term generally used when
describing the killing of infants or children.' Infanticide has been further
narrowed by distinguishing between the killing of an infant within twenty four
hours of birth, neonaticide2 , and killing an infant or child older than twentyfour hours, filicide a . All cases discussed or referenced in this comment
concern the killing of a child within twenty-four hours of birth.
Part I of this comment discusses the history of infanticide, which includes
neonaticide. Part I reviews background information of neonaticide. Part III
reports how neonaticide is defined and prosecuted in the United States,
including defenses which have been used and sentencing. Part IV reports how
other countries define and prosecute neonaticide, including available defenses
and sentencing. Part V compares neonaticide in the United States to other
countries including an analysis of possible changes which the legislatures may
consider when defining and prosecuting the crime of neonaticide.
I.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF INFANTICIDE

4
The Biblical story of Abraham preparing to kill his son, Isaac, is the
earliest reference to infanticide. In ancient Greece, the killing of weak and
deformed infants was not only practiced, but was required by law in some
states.5 At this time, the killing of "normal" infants was not approved of 6 but

1.

IAN BROCKINGTON, MOTHERHOOD AND MENTAL HEALTH, 430 (1996).

2. Dr. Phillip Resnick was the first to define the killing of an infant within twenty-four
hours as neonaticide. Phillip J.Resnick, M.D., Murder of the Newborn: A Psychiatric Review
of Neonaticide, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1414 (1970).
3. Id. at 1414.
4. Genesis 22. Abraham prepared to kill his son after God asked him to as a test of
his loyalty. As Abraham was about to kill his son, God told him stop. Id.
5. MICHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE, 316 (1983). In Sparta, weak or
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was rarely questioned by authorities because it was viewed as part of the
rights of the head of household, patria potens. 7 "Normal" infants who were
killed included illegitimates, females, excess children' and the offspring of
slaves.9 The acceptance of infanticide started to change with the introduction
of Christianity. ° The Emperor Constantine, who converted to Christianity,
decreed in 318 A.D. that the killing of a son or daughter was as serious a
crime as the killing of one's father." Even with laws prohibiting infanticide,
its occurrence continued through the middle ages. Infanticide continued, in
part, because of the pressure on the serf family to have healthy males to work
the land, placing handicapped and female infants at risk of becoming victims
2
of infanticide.
Christianity and its teachings spread throughout Europe changing some
of the beliefs and laws concerning infanticide. However, strong pagan beliefs
and superstitions continued to result in the death of infants. 3 Handicapped,
disabled, and those who had an unusual appearance or behaved inappropriately, such as excessive crying or laughing, were at the highest risk of being
killed. These infants were at risk of being killed because of the belief that
such infants were not the true offspring of the parent but were instead of
supernatural origin. 4 While the method of killing an infant of "supernatural
origin" was usually brutal," the most common method of killing was
suffocation. 6 Other methods included drowning and burning.'i Penalties for

sickly children were thrown into a cavern after being examined by elders and in Athens, a father
could kill his child any time before the fifth day. BROCKINGTON, supra note 1, at 430.
6. TOOLEY, supra note 5, at 316.
7. See Kathryn L. Moseley, M.D., The History of Infanticide in Western Society, 1
IssuEs iN LAW AND MEDICINE 345, 349 (1986).
8. Id. at 349.
9. BROCKINGTON, supra note 1, at 431.
10. See Moseley, supra note 7, at 351.
11. Id. at 351-52. Infanticide had been rejected by Judaism but it had little impact on
the views of infanticide compared with Christianity. See also ToolEY, supra note 5, at 318.

This was one of the first times that the killing of one's child was equated to murder and was
further established in 374 A.D. when Constantine decreed that the killing of an infant was
homicide. Id. at 352.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 352-53.
15. Id. at 353. The killing was usually accomplished by beating, burning or other
maltreatment of the infant so that the infant would be rescued by fairies. Id.
16. Id. at 355. This was commonly called overlaying because the mother would claim
that the infant was smothered because it was so close to her on the bed. See id. at 355-56.
17. Id. at 355. Burning of the child occurred by allowing the child to fall into a cooking
fire. Id.
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mothers found to have committed infanticide ranged from a penance of one
year on bread and water and two more years without wine or meat to death."
Infanticide continued to occur throughout England and Europe but
prosecutions and convictions were relatively rare.' 9 Sympathy for the
defendants and difficulty in distinguishing between murder and infant
mortality from natural causes contributed to leniency and difficulty in
prosecuting the crime.2 Concern by the public over rapid population growth
and poverty in the seventeenth century led to the secularization of crimes
involving sexual offenses such as bastardy and fornication.2 It was acknowledged that women who became pregnant in violation of these sexual offenses
could evade punishment by disposing of the evidence-the newborn infant.22
Strict enforcement of the laws punishing infanticide was therefore necessary
to ensure conformity to the laws regulating illicit sexual and reproductive
behavior.23 For example, in 1693, the Parliament of England passed a law
guiding juries in bastard neonaticide cases. The new law titled "An act to
prevent the destroying and murdering of bastard children" focused on "lewd
women" and "bastard children."' The law made it a capital offense for a
woman who had concealed her bastard child's birth, to secretly bury the body,
whether the child was born alive or dead.25 There was a presumption that the
infant was born alive, and therefore a presumption of guilt, unless the woman
could produce at least one witness to say that the infant had been born dead.2 6
These new, strict laws and increased prosecutions did not eliminate the
killing of infants, in part because of continued leniency of the juries and
defenses which had come to be accepted. 27 These defenses included "benefit
of linen," in which the defendant demonstrated that she made linen in
preparation for the birth of the infant, and "want of help," in which the
defendant could argue that the infant died despite her efforts to secure

18. See id. at 356-57. The strictest penalties were for unwed mothers. Id.at 357.
19. Michael Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming To Terms With Modem Infanticide,
34 AM. CRIM. L. REv.. 1, 7 (1996).
20. See id. at 7-8.

21.

Id. at 8-9.

23.

Id.

22.

Id. at9.

24. PEER C. HoFIER & N.E.H. Hull,MURDERING
AND NEW ENGLAND 1558-1803 at 19-20 (1981).
25. Id.at 20.

MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE IN ENGLAND

26. See id, at 20. New England states such as Massachusetts and Connecticut adopted
this same statute, verbatim, in the late 1600's. Id. at 59-62. Virginia also adopted the statute
in 1710. Rhode Island never adopted the statute. Id. at 63.
27. Oberman, supra note 19, at 10-11.
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assistance.' The conviction rate of infanticide decreased during the mid and
late 1700's due to juries who favored the defendant, acceptance of old and
new defenses and concerns over capital punishment for the crime.29 In 1803
Parliament passed a revised infanticide law which made the crime of
infanticide subject to the same rules of evidence as murder. The 1803 law
required the prosecution to prove the infant was born alive?3 The revised Act
also provided for a lesser offense punishable by up to two years in prison in
those cases where the woman had concealed her pregnancy but the prosecution could not prove the infant was born alive.3
The crime of infanticide was still punishable by capital punishment so the
lesser offense of concealment of an illegitimate birth became the offense
preferred by juries in the infanticide cases.32 In 1828, England again revised
the infanticide law expanding the law concerning concealment of illegitimate
births to all women, as opposed to only "lewd" women.33 With the prosecution of any woman for the crime of infanticide, juries and judges began to
accept defenses of temporary insanity based on the effects of birth on the
woman's mental health.' The defenses and presumptions that something
must be psychologically wrong with a woman who would commit such an act
led to the repeal of the 1803 infanticide law.35 The British Infanticide Act of
1922 allowed for a woman to be convicted of manslaughter instead of murder
for the killing of her infant because of the premise that her mind may be

28.

Id at 11. The "want of help" defense included actions such as "prior arrangement

with a midwife, cries for help drowned out by passing carriages, a mistakenly locked door, a
sudden illness preventing the solicitation of assistance, or a fall on the way to obtain help ......
HOFFER &HULL, supra note 24, at 69.
29. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 24, at 70-86. New defenses included pleas of
accidental death and medical incapacity. Id.at 70.
30. See MARK JACKSON, NEW-BORN CHMD MURDER 170 (1996).
31. See id. at 171. In 1784, Massachusetts' lawmakers anticipated the change in the
statute and had passed a law concerning the offense of concealing the death of a bastard child
in 1784. HOFFER & HULL,supra note 24, at 90. Massachusetts still has a statute concerning

concealment entitled "Concealment of death of child born out of wedlock." MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272 § 22 (West 1990).

Connecticut has also retained its statute concerning

concealment, "Concealment of delivery." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-237a (West 1994).
Other New England states, such as Connecticut followed this precedent also dividing their
infanticide laws. Id. at 90-91.

32. See Oberman,supra note 19, at 12.
33. Id. at 12-13.
34. Id. at 13. These defenses included "puerperal mania" and "lactational insanity."
Id. Puerperal mania was a psychological disorder thought to arise from the effects of giving
birth. Lactational insanity was a psychological disorder thought to arise from the effects on the
mother during nursing. Id.
35. Id. at 15.
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disturbed because she had not fully recovered from the effect of giving birth.36
The 1922 Act was further revised in 1938 defining the act of infanticide to be
the killing of infants under the age of twelve months.3" The Infanticide Act
of 1938 remains law in England today.38

II. BACKGROUND OF NEONATICIDE

The latest available statistics indicate that in 1995, forty-nine children
under the age of four weeks old were murdered.39 While this number includes
infants up to four weeks old, other experts believe that there are at least twohundred-fifty cases of neonaticide a year in the United States.' Studies and
literature concerning neonaticide indicate that most neonaticide is committed
by the mother as opposed to the father."' The females committing neonaticide
are generally young,42 single, and living with their parents, guardians, or other
relatives.43 The women spread across all races, ethnicities and socioeconomic
classes but are generally independently poor." Most of the women committing neonaticide also conceal their pregnancies. 4
The concealment of the pregnancy may aid in understanding why most
of the women also do not acknowledge their pregnancies.' The woman
36.

Id.

39.

Martha T. Moore, DesperateActs ofDesperateMoms, USATODAY, June 25, 1997,

37. Infanticide Act of 1938, 1938, 1&2 Geo. 6, ch. 36 (Eng.).
38. Id. In the United States, the laws in the New England states which specifically
pertained to the killing of children were repealed and today, such killing is prosecuted under the
general homicide statutes. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a (West 1994) (defining
murder); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-55 (West 1994) (defining manslaughter in the first
degree); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56 (West 1994) (defining manslaughter in the second
degree); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 1 (West 1990) (defining murder including second
degree murder).
at 3A (containing statisics from the National Center for Health Statistics).
40. NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, June 24, 1997).
41. See Neil S. Kaye, M.D., Neal M. Borenstein, M.D., and Susan M. Donnelly, M.D.,
Families,Murder, and Insanity: A PsychiatricReview of ParentalNeonaticide,35 J. FORENsIc

Sci. 133, 134-35 (1990) [hereinafter Kaye et al.]; See also, Resnick, supra note 2, at 1415-17
(finding thirty-four mothers, two fathers, and both mother and father had committed neonaticide
out of thirty-seven cases).
42. Oberman, supra note 19, at 23. In Oberman's research of forty seven neonaticides,
the mean age was twenty-one and the median age was twenty. Id. at 23 n.90. See also Resnick,
supra note 2, at 1415 (finding mothers' ages ranged 16-38 years old).
43. Oberman, supra note 19, at 23. Twenty-four out of forty-seven women lived with
parents, nine lived with relatives or other roommates, only two out of forty-seven lived alone.
Id. at 23 & n.91.
44. Id. at 23. Most of the woman's' financial resources come from their parents. Id.
45. Id. at 24; see also, Resnick, supra note 2, at 1416 (finding a prominent feature was
concealment from the woman's mother).
46. See generally Oberman, supra note 19, at 24-25 (stating that most of the women
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generally gives birth to the child alone, most often in the bathroom, because
the woman feels the need to defecate.47 Many of the women spend hours in
labor without making any sounds4 trying to ensure that no one in the home
will hear the labor. 49 Afterwards, many of the women describe the delivery
as if they were watching themselves give birth from another part of the room.
They often do not recognize or are oblivious to the pain they experienced. 5°
The method of killing, in order of frequency, includes suffocation, strangulation, trauma to the head, drowning, exposure and stabbings. 5' Explanations
by the accused for the motive in one study indicated that "unwanted child"
was the most common motive followed by murders committed by mothers
under the influence of hallucinogens, epilepsy or delirium. 52 Examples of
methods for disposal of the infant include throwing the child in the trash,53
disposing of the infant in a fields' and placing the infant in a container, such
as a suitcase and then hiding the container.55
III.

NEONATICIDE INTHE UNITED STATES

A person charged with the crime of killing an infant in the United States
is prosecuted under the state's homicide statute in which the killing took
place.56 Statutes in the United States generally define murder as the "killing

did not recognize that they were going into labor, thinking it was simply cramping or stomach
pains).
47.
48.

Id. at 25.
Id.

56.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Meder, 611 A.2d 213, 214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)

49. BROCINGTON, supra note 1,at 438. In some cases, the infant was delivered in the
same room with both parents or in the same room with a sleeping houseguest. Id. at 438.
50. Intemight, (Broadcast by MSNBC, June 24, 1997). Statement made by Dr. Margret
Spinelli from the New York Psychiatric Institute who evaluated fifteen women who have been
charged with killing their babies. Id.
51. Oberman, supra note 19, at 25; Resnick, supranote 2, at 1415. Suffocation seems
to appear in part because of the desire of the mother to keep the infant from crying out.
Drowning tends to occur in the toilet which the woman was on while giving birth. Oberman,
supra note 19, at 25.
52. Resnick, supra note 2, at 1415. Out of the thirty-seven neonaticide cases studied
by Resnick, twenty-nine killings were classified as "unwanted child" for the motive and four
were classified as "acutely psychotic." It.
53. See, e.g., People v. Wernick, 632 N.Y.S.2d 839, 840 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(finding that the mother had thrown the baby in the trash).
54. See, e.g., People v. Sophia, 234 Cal. Rptr. 698, 699 (Cal.Ct. App. 1987) (finding
that the mother disposed of the baby in a field).
55. See, e.g., People v. Shepard, 124 N.W.2d 712,716 (Iowa 1963) (finding the mother
placed the infant in a suitcase and then hid the suitcase in a closet).
(charging Meder with first and third degree murder for the strangulation of her newborn);
People v. Sophia, 234 Cal. Rptr. 698 (Cal.Ct. App. 1987) (charging Sophia with murder under
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of a human being"57 or" to cause the death of another person." 8 There is no
distinction between the killing of an infant/child and a "non-infant/child."59
Nor do the courts generally use the term infanticide or neonaticide in their
opinions.' Without specific statutes addressing neonaticide, the charges
against an individual for killing her infant range from first degree murder" to
manslaughter.62
First degree murder is defined differently in many jurisdictions.

Definitions generally include one or more of the following: murder with

malice aforethought;63 intentionally causing the death of another; causing the
death of another while committing a felony or with extreme indifference to the
value of human life." Some jurisdictions, such as Colorado, include
knowingly causing the death of a child younger than thirteen years old as an
offense of murder in the first degree.65 A lesser offense of second degree
murder is found in most jurisdictions when the facts of the crime do not
conform with the jurisdiction's first degree murder statute."
A killing which is not committed knowingly or is committed by the
recklessness of the person is generally prosecuted by the state under a
manslaughter statute. 67 By reviewing the circumstances of most neonaticides"

Pen. Code, § 187).
57. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988).
58. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a (West 1994).
59. Cf Infanticide Act 1938, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 36 (Eng.) (statute in England
which specifically addresses the offense of infanticide).
60. See, e.g., Shepard, 124 N.W.2d at 712-22; Meder, 611 A.2d at 213-18. But see
Sophia, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (using the term infanticide in the decision).
61. See, e.g.,Holt v. Wisconsin, 117 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Wis. 1962) (charging and
convicting defendant of first degree murder).
62. People v. Wang, 490 N.Y.S.2d 423 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (charging defendant with
manslaughter).
63. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 1 (West 1990).
64. E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102
(West 1990).
65. E.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (West 1990).
66. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 1993) (allowing prosecution for
second degree murder if the person is under a "sudden and intense passion resulting from
serious provocation" and if the person believed that the killing was justified); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-3-102 (West 1990) (stating a person commits second degree murder when he knowingly
causes the death of a person).
67. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3 (West 1993)(stating, in part, that a
person who kills unintentionally kills another person if his acts are likely to cause death and he
performs the act recklessly); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (West 1990) (stating that a person
commits manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of another).
68. The common characteristics are a single mother giving birth alone, the body of the
infant found later in the trash with a cause of death either being suffocation, strangulation or
drowning. Oberman, supra note 19, at 25 ; Resnick, supra note 2, at 1415.
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it is easy to predict that most people charged with the killing of their newborns

can be charged with first degree murder. In a survey of twenty-seven cases of
neonaticide in the United States,69 nine opinions indicated that the defendant
was charged with first degree murder;7 ° sixteen opinions indicated that the
defendant was charged with "murder,"'" one opinion stated that the defendant
was charged with manslaughter72 and one opinion did not indicate the
charge." This survey's finding that ninety-three percent (25/27) of the
defendants were charged with either first or second degree murder indicates
that the states view the defendant as either intentionally or knowingly
committing the killing of the newborn.74
A defendant may be charged with first or second degree murder, but

cases indicate that many times a defendant is convicted of a lesser charge.73

In fifteen of twenty-seven cases reviewed the defendant was convicted of a
lesser charge.76 One possible explanation for the number of defendants
69. The survey was conducted by searching the WESTLAW database of cases, of each
state, using term searches of "infanticide", "neonaticide" and "murder killing Is infant child."
The search was completed between August 31, 1997 and September 7, 1997. Only cases
involving the murder of the infant within twenty-four hours of birth were used in the survey.
70. Singleton v. State, 35 So.2d 375 (Ala. Ct. App. 1948); People v. Sophia, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Kirby 194 N.W. 142 (Mich. 1923); State v. Vogue,
266 N.W. 265 (Minn. 1936); People v. Wernick, 674 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1996); Commonwealth
v. Meder, 611 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Ellison v. State, 127 S.W. 542 (Tex. Crim. App.
1910); Holt v. Sate, 117 N.W.2d 626 (Wis. 1962); State v. Osmus, 276 P.2d 469 (Wyo. 1954).
71. The 16 opinions did not specify first degree murder, the opinions stated that the
person was charged with murder. Weaver v. State, 132 So. 706 (Ala. Ct. App. 1931); Graham
v. State, 642 S.W.2d 342 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1947); Williams v. People, 158 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1945); Montgomery v. State, 44 S.E.2d
242 (Ga. 1947); White v. State, 232 S.E.2d 57 (Ga. 1977); Hall v. State, 253 S.E.2d 160 (Ga.
1979); State v. Ryan, 138 N.E.2d 516 (Ill. 1956); State v. Thompson, 124 N.W.2d 712 (Iowa
1963); State v. Stringer, 211 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. 1948); State v. Doyle, 287 N.W.2d 59 (Neb.
1980); Commonwealth v. Reilly, 549 A.2d 503 (Pa. 1988); State v. Collongton, 192 S.E.2d 856
(S.C. 1972); Harris v. State, 17 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Ct. App. 1891); Cordes v. State, 112 S.W. 943
(Tex. Crim. App. 1908); Lane v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 781 (Va. 1978).
72. People v. Wang, 490 N.Y.S.2d 423 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
73. Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963). Defendant was convicted of
manslaughter. Id.
74. See generally 720 IL.L COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 1993) (defining first degree
murder); 720 IlL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 1993) (defining second degree murder). A
survey of forty-seven neonaticides conducted by Oberman found that of the forty-two which
indicated what the defendant was charged, 74% were charged with murder, 21% were charged
with manslaughter. See Oberman, supra note 19, at 93-96.
75. See, e.g., Osmus, 276 P.2d at 470 (charged with first degree murder, convicted of
manslaughter); Sophia, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 698 (charged with first degree murder, convicted of
manslaughter).
76. Singleton, 35 So.2d at 375; Sophia, 234 Ca. Rptr. at 698; Chavez, 176 P.2d at 92;
Ryan, 138 N.E.2d at 517; Kirby, 194 N.W. at 143; Voges, 266 N.W. at 265; Stringer, 211
S.W.2d at 927; Doyle, 287 N.W.2d at 60; Wernick, 674 N.E.2d at 323; Reilly, 549 A.2d at 505;
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convicted of a lesser charge may be judge and/or jury apathy due to the
available punishments for a conviction of first or second degree murder."
While no state has specific statutes addressing infanticide or neonaticide,
some states do have statutes pertaining to the concealment of the death of a
child born out of wedlock"8 or the concealment of the delivery of a child.79
These types of statutes, some of which date back to 1696,' ° appear to be
states' attempts to address some of the aspects of neonaticide which prompted
England to revise its infanticide statutes.8 For example, the Massachusetts
statute, "Concealment of death of child born out of wedlock,"82 allows the
state to prosecute a parent who conceals the death of his/her child so that if it
cannot be determined if the child was born alive or, if born alive, and then the
child was murdered. 3 In the Connecticut statute, "concealment of delivery"'"
allows the state to prosecute a person who intentionally conceals the delivery
of a child regardless of whether the child was born alive or dead. 5 With
statutes such as these, the state can still punish the defendant without having
to prove that the infant was born alive, an element that can be difficult for the
state to prove and is a common defense used by those accused.86
Generally, however, for a conviction of murder the state must prove that
the infant was born alive and the person charged was the killing agent.8 7
Collington, 192 S.E.2d at 857; Harris,17 S.W. at 1110; Lane, 248 S.E.2d at 781; Osmus, 276
P.2d at 470; Bennett, 377 P.2d at 635. A determination if the defendant was convicted of a
lesser charge could not be determined in four of the cases. Weaver, 132 So. at 706; Graham,
642 S.W.2d at 342; Wang, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 423; Meder, 611 A.2d at 213.
77. These punishments range from death for first degree murder, e.g., 720 ILL COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 1993), to life in prison for second degree murder, e.g., MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 265 § 2 (West 1990). Whereas, the maximum prison sentence for a conviction
of manslaughter in Colorado is six years and the minimum is two years. COLO. REv. STAT. §
18-1-105 (West 1990).
78. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 22 (West 1990).
79. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-237a (West 1994).
80. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272 § 22 (West 1990).
81. Difficulty in determining if the infant was born alive and judge and jury apathy
towards the women charged with crime of infanticide because of the possibility of capital
punishment led England to revise its laws. See generally Obermansupra note 19, at 12-14.
82. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272 § 22 (West 1990).
83. Ud Massachusetts also allows for a parent charged with murder of an infant born
out of wedlock to be charged with concealment, and if acquitted of murder, to be convicted of
concealment. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272 § 23 (West 1990).
84. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-237a (West 1994).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Voges, 266 N.W. at 266 (finding that there was insufficient evidence to
establish that the mother caused the newborn's death); Lane, 248 S.E.2d at 783 (finding that the
state did not prove that the newborn had an independent and separate existence from its mother).
87. Doyle, 287 N.W.2d at 63. The killing agent is the person who caused the child's

death. d
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There are three concepts of "alive" which have been developed by the various
jurisdictions: "life" is when the infant has reached the point where it is
capable of living an independent life outside of the mother, including a child
which is in the process of being born;8" the infant must have an independent
existence outside of the mother's body 9 or the infant must have an independent existence outside of the mother's body, including an independent
circulation and/or respiration." The difficulty in proving that the infant was
born alive sometimes results in the inability to convict at trial9 and/or reversal
at the appellate level.92 The defense that the infant was not born alive is a
defense directed at an element of the crime. However, the inability to prove
the individual charged with the crime was the killing agent is generally easier
to prove because of the methods used in the killing and the availability of
evidence showing the woman recently gave birth.93
Another defense claimed by the accused is the affirmative defense of
insanity.94 Just as different jurisdictions define "alive" differently, different
jurisdictions have various standards to prove a person insane in a criminal
trial.95 In the study of neonaticides conducted by Oberman, seven women, out
of forty-seven, claimed the defense of insanity.96 While the circumstances
surrounding the women giving birth are generally extreme, it is unlikely that
a person would find the mother meets a state's definition of insanity. For
88.
89.
90.

See Singleton, 35 So.2d at 379.
See Harris v. State, 12 S.W. 1102,1103 (Tex. Ct. App. 1889).
Wang, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 426 (citing Jackson v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.2d 1014

94.

E.g., Reilly, 549 A.2d at 505; Wernick; 632 N.Y.S.2d at 840.

(1936)).
91. See generally Oberman, supra note 19, at 25 (discussing the wide range of
outcomes of neonaticide cases as they proceed through the criminal justice system including no
charges being brought against the mother).
92. See, e.g., Lane, 248 S.E.2d at 784 (reversing the conviction because of lack of
evidence that the infant had an "independent and separate existence apart from its mother");
White, 232 S.E.2d at 57 (reversing conviction because the pathologist did not testify the infant
achieved "independent and separate existence from its mother").
93. See, e.g., Collington, 192 S.E.2d at 858 (finding evidence that both lungs were full
of air contradicted the mother's claim that the child was not born alive so she placed it in a trash
bag, actual cause of death was suffocation); Holt, 117 N.W.2d at 633 (finding evidence of a
charred human torso in the furnace enough proof that the defendant was the killing agent).
95. Tests for insanity include the M'Naughten Test: if at the time of the act the person
either did know the nature and quality of the act or he/she did not know that it was wrong; and
the Durham Test: if the unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect. JOSHUA
DRESSIER, UNDERSTANDING CRiMiNAL LAw at 319-23 (1995). Under the Model Penal Code
a person is not responsible for his criminal act if he "lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or the requirements of law" because of a mental disease or defect
which existed at the time of the criminal conduct. MODELPENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1974).

96.
97.

Oberman, supra note 19, at 99.
BROCKINGTON, supra note 1, at 443.
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example, Stephanie Wernick gave birth to a baby boy in her dormitory
bathroom and killed the baby by stuffing toilet paper in its mouth; she then put
the infant in a garbage bag.98 At trial, Stephanie presented expert testimony
establishing that she denied the pregnancy, that denial occurs in most cases in
which a woman kills her child immediately after birth, and that after birth she
suffered from a brief "reactive psychosis because she could no longer deny the
reality of her pregnancy." 99 The expert concluded that during the "psychotic
state," Stephanie was able to perform purposeful acts but was "not able to
appreciate the nature and consequences of her conduct."" Stephanie was
convicted by a jury for criminally negligent homicide."0 '
Another defense which has been raised is mistake of fact due to the
mother not knowing she was pregnant."° The defense of mistake of fact
attempts to negate the required mens rea of the crime.'0 3 Findings by
psychiatrists that many of the women in neonaticide cases deny their
pregnancy,"' expert evidence offered at trial that denial occurs in many of the
neonaticide cases, and evidence that many of the women really did not know
they were pregnant, 5 have not made mistake of fact a viable defense." 6
While the mother may have denied the pregnancy, the jury generally finds that
the requisite state of mind for a conviction has been met. 0 7

IV. NEONATICIDE IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Neonaticide is not a crime which only takes place in the United States but
is one that occurs world-wide.0 Many nations have addressed the crime of
neonaticide by passing statutes specifically addressing the crime." 9 The
98. Wernick, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 840, afTd, 651 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. 1996).
99. Id. at 840.
100. Id.
101. Wernick, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
102. Oberman, supra note 19, at 94-96.
103. DRESSLER, supra note 95, at 134-35.
104. See generally Oberman, supra note 19, at 24-25 (most of the women did not
recognize that they were going into labor, thinking it was simply cramping or stomach pains).

105. Wernick, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 840, aff'd, 651 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. 1996).
106. In Oberman's study of forty-nine neonaticides, four claimed a defense of mistake
of fact; all four were found guilty. See generally Oberman, supra note 19, at 94-96.
107. The circumstances surrounding the killing, including the method of killing and the
hiding of the dead infant, leads the jury to a conclusion that the required state of mind for
conviction was present. See, e.g., Sophia, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (finding that the mother's

admission of twice stifling the infant's cries to prevent detection and disposing of the infant by
placing it in a bag and dropping it behind a fence, was sufficient evidence of intent).
108.

See generallyOberman,supra note 19, at 14-20 (discussing neonaticide in England,

109.

See, e.g., Infanticide Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6 Ch. 36 (Eng.); Infanticide, R.S.C.,

Austria, the Philippines, Korea and Italy).
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majority of the neonaticide (infanticide)"' statutes make the crime of
infanticide a lesser offense than homicide."' Nations define infanticide
differently. The most common elements include: (1) a mother who kills her
infant; (2) after the child has been born; and (3) the killing took place because
she had not fully recovered from the effects of giving birth."' The infanticide
statutes are applicable for only a certain amount of time between the birth and
the killing ranging from "newly-born child""' 3 to a "child under the age of
twelve months." 4 Some countries, such as Austria and the Philippines also
limit the exercise of the statute based on the defendant's marital status." 5
Infanticide statutes also generally allow for a more lenient punishment. For
example, in Canada, if a person was convicted of first or second degree
murder, the sentence is life imprisonment." 6 If a person is found guilty of
manslaughter, the punishment is a minimum of four years to life imprisonment."' Finally, a mother guilty of infanticide can only be imprisoned for a
maximum of five years."'
Although the Canadian statute allows for a prison term of up to five years
for a conviction of infanticide, the case law indicates that convictions are
difficult to obtain. Furthermore, if convicted, the maximum sentence is rarely
issued or upheld.' 9 Similarly, the punishment in England is rarely imprison-

ch. C-46, § 233 (1985) (Can.); Crimes Act, 1900, ch. 22A (Austl.)<http://www.austlii.edu.au/
do2/disp.pl/au/...t/ca 190082/s22a.html?query=%Einfanticide.(1997) [hereinafter Crimes Act,
1900, ch. 22A (Austl.)].
110. The term infanticide is used throughout this section due to its use in the statutes.
All the statutes would include neonaticide.
111. See, e.g., Infanticide Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6 Ch. 36 (Eng.) (allowing a verdict
of "infanticide" instead of murder or manslaughter); Crimes Act, 1900, ch. 22A (Austl.)
(allowing a verdict of "guilty of infanticide" instead of murder). But see Oberman, supra note
19, at 18 (finding the Luxembourg statute provides a more severe penalty for the killing of a
child than for other homicides).
112. See, e.g., Infanticide Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6 Ch. 36 (Eng.) (stating "[W]here a
women ... causes the death of her child ... but at the time ... her mind was disturbed by
reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth of the child ....
). See
also Greece Penal Code article 303, Infanticide, which states "[Tihe offender must be a mother
who intentionally kills her child during childbirth, or after it but during the period of disturbance
of her organism due to such childbirth." INTRoDucTION TO GREEK LAW 314 (Konstantinos D.
Kerameus & Phaedon J. Kozyris eds., 1988).
113. Infanticide, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 233 (1985) (Can.).
114. Infanticide Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6 Ch. 36 (Eng.).
115. Oberman, supra note 19, at 18-19. In Austria and the Philippines killing a
legitimate child carries a more severe penalty than the killing of an illegitimate child. Id. at 19.
116. Punishment for Murder, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 235 (1985) (Can.).
117. Manslaughter, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 236 (1985) (Can.).
118. Punishment for Infanticide, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 237 (1985) (Can.).
119. See, e.g., Regina v. Smith [1976] 32 C.C.C.2d 224 (dismissing the charges and
conviction of a seventeen year old girl who covered the newborn's mouth so her father would
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ment. In Regina v. Salsbury,2 ' the United Kingdom's Criminal Appellate
Court found that out of the fifty-nine cases of infanticide recorded for the time
period of 1979 through 1988, not one resulted in a sentence of
imprisonment.'
One explanation for the unwillingness of the courts to issue
sentences of imprisonment is due to the language in the statutes which almost
presumes that the mother was not well because of the birth process.'
V.

A COMPARISON OF NEONATICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER
COMMON LAW COUNTRIES

Neonaticide occurs both in the United States and other common law
countries. The facts pertaining to the mother, the pregnancy, the method of
killing and the method of disposal are indistinguishable.'
In both the United
States and other common law countries, the mother accused of killing her
newborn may be charged and prosecuted with murder. The possibility of the
mother being charged with murder in the United States is almost certain, while
in other common law countries, the mother is most likely to be charged with
infanticide. 24 A man who kills a newborn would be charged with murder in
not be awakened due to reasonable doubt that she acted willfully if she was only trying to quiet
the baby); Regina v. Szola [1977] 33 C.C.C. 2d 572 (finding that the twenty-four year old
mother who permitted her new-born to drop to the floor, should be on probation instead of in
jail because "the accused was very ill and deterrence was obviously not applicable").
120. Regina v. Salsbury, 11 Crim. App. 533 (1989).
121. Id. The court found that there were fifty-two sentences of probation or supervision,
six sentences of hospitalization and one sentence of restricted hospitalization. Id. See also
Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Aug. 4, 1997). Professor and defense attorney
Michael Dowd stated that there has not been a sentence of incarceration in England for the
crime of infanticide for close to fifty-five years. Id.
122. E.g., Infanticide Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6 Ch. 36 (Eng.). The England statute
reads in part, "[W]here a woman by any willful act or omission causes the death of her child
being a child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the balance
of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not fully recovered from the effect of giving birth
to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon birth of the child, then,
notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for this Act the offense would have
amounted to murder, she shall be guilty of felony, to wit of infanticide .
I..."
Id. Statements
in the cases made by the judges such as, "[The baby was no[t] moving and apparently gave no
sign of life, and it does not seem to me that your mental state was such to enable you to consider
rationally whether the baby was alive or dead." support the conclusion that the mental state of
the women is presumed to be affected due to the birth process. Regina v. Lewis, 11 Crim. App.
577 (1989).
123. See supra pp. 7-8.
124. In the United States the mother is usually charged and prosecuted for murder with
reliance on the jury and/or judge to take into account the facts surrounding the death of the
newborn. Taking the facts into consideration usually leads to findings of not guilty or guilty of
a lesser offense. Oberman, supra note 19, at 77-78. With the availability of the Infanticide Acts
in other common law countries, the mother is usually charged with infanticide. See, e.g., Regina
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both the United States and other common law countries because the infanticide acts are only applicable to mothers who have recently given birth.'2 5 In
the United States and other common law countries the prosecution has the

burden of proving all of the elements of the crime charged to convict the
26

mother.
Another similarity is the availability of the insanity defense. 127 The
defense of insanity may be available in both the United States and other
common law countries but does not appear to be used very often in the
common law countries that have specific infanticide acts. 28 The lack of this
defense being raised in countries which have infanticide acts may be due to
the presence of the act and the presumption that the mother has a disturbed
mind that the acts generate. The presumption that the mother's mind was
disturbed, in essence eliminates the need to claim insanity because it assumes
that a women who kills her baby must have had a disturbed mind. 129 In
addition, while the infanticide acts still generally allow a conviction of

manslaughter, 30 the risk that the women in the countries with infanticide acts

might be sentenced to incarceration is very remote.131
In the United States, without the presumption that the mother's mind is
disturbed, the need to bring up the defense of insanity is paramount. In
neonaticide cases in the United States, the defense must claim insanity and
must try to prove, by expert witnesses, that the mother's mind was
disturbed. 32 The infanticide acts also allow the mother to be convicted of the
lesser charge of manslaughter. Again, without the presumption of a disturbed
v. Smith [1976] 32 C.C.C.2d 224 (charging the mother with infanticide); Regina v. Szola [1977]
33 C.C.C. 2d 572 (charging the mother with infanticide).
125. E.g., Infanticide Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6 Ch.36 (Eng.).
126. See, e.g., 720 IlL COMP. STAT. 5/9.1 (West 1993) (defining first degree murder
"[A] person who kills any individual ....
");Infanticide Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6 Ch. 36
(Eng.) (stating "[W]here a women by any willful act.., causes the death of her child ....
)
127. See supra note 94. See also Infanticide Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6 Ch. 36 (Eng.)
(stating "[N]othing in this Act shall affect the power of the jury upon an indictment for the
murder of a child to return... a verdict of guilty but insane ....
)
128. None of the four neonaticide cases from other common law countries located by the
WESTLAW search (England and Canada). See supra note 69. Regina v. Salsbury, 11 Crim. App.
533 (1989); Regina v. Lewis, 11 Crim. App. 577 (1989); Regina v. Smith [1976] 32 c.c.c.2d
224; Regina v. Szola [1977] 33 C.C.C. 2d 572. But see pp. 14-15 (discussing the use of the
insanity defense in the United States).
129. See, e.g., Regina v. Smith [1976] 32 C.C.C.2d 224 (stating "it is almost self-evident
that she [the mother] would be in a disturbed state of mind and might act in an irrational manner
130. E.g., Infanticide Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6 Ch.36 (Eng.).
131. Seesuprap. 17 andnote 121.
132. See, e.g., Wernick, 674 N.E.2d at 323 (claiming insanity, defendant presented
testimony from expert witness).
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mind, testimony of the woman's state of mind is imperative to try to get a
conviction of a lesser charge in the United States.' 33 The cases available also
indicate that the defense that all of the elements of the crime have not been
proven is not generally used in common law countries with an infanticide
act. 3
One of the most significant differences between the United States and
other common law countries with an infanticide act is sentencing. The
presumption that the woman's mind was disturbed appears to help the woman
receive treatment instead of incarceration. 35 Women convicted of neonaticide
in the United States are generally incarcerated, sometimes for life. 36 In
addition, long term incarceration is very probable with the passing of laws
sentencing for many crimes in the
instituting mandatory, non-discretionary
37
United States, including homicide.'
The differences in how the United States and other common law
countries that have an infanticide act prosecute and sentence a woman who
has been charged with the crime of killing her newborn are quite striking.
Most laws of the United States were derived from the laws of England, yet the
United States has not followed England's philosophy concerning this crime.
To aid in determining which method, if either, is the best way to treat

133. See, e.g., 720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3 (West 1994) (defining Involuntary
Manslaughter as "[A] person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification
commits involuntary manslaughter .... ) Testimony of the mother's state of mind is also needed
if the defense attorney is trying to obtain the judge's or jury's sympathy to obtain a not guilty
verdict or guilt of a lesser charge.
134. One of the women in the four cases from England and Canada had the charges
dismissed because the judge determined that she did not act "willfully." Regina v. Smith [1976]
32 C.C.C.2d 224. The availability of the lesser conviction of manslaughter and the uncertainty
of incarceration may contribute to the lack of the use of this defense.
135. See, e.g., Regina v. Szola [1977] 33 C.C.C. 2d 572 (finding that "jail was no place
for this accused and she should be returned to the community immediately so that as far as
possible her treatment would bring her a cure."); Regina v. Salsbury, 11 Crim. App. 533
(1989) (substituting probation instead of incarceration because probation "will best serve the
interests not only of this appellant but of society as well .... ) See also supra note 121.
136. See, e.g., Holt, 117 N.W.2d at 473 (affirming the conviction and life sentence of
Holt). See also Anna Cekola, Women Gets 15 to Life for Killing Her Baby Crime: Despite
Evidence FullertonResident Had Mental Problems When She Delivered Boy, Judge Says He
Had to Send Her to Prison,LOs ANGELES TIMES, May 13, 1997, at B I (reporting that the judge
stated he would not sentence the defendant to probation because to do so would "reduce the
gravity of the offense in a manner this court is not willing to do").
137. E.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-105 (West 1990). Section 18-1-105 sets forth the
presumptive maximum and minimum sentences for conviction of a felony in Colorado. The
most discretion given to the judge, based on mitigating evidence, is the ability to sentence the
convicted one-half the presumptive minimum sentence. Id. at § 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(E) to
(2)(a)(6).
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neonaticide, the method(s) of prosecution and the reason(s) for punishing the
crime of neonaticide must be evaluated.
A.

THE METHOD OF PROSECUTION

The method of prosecution in the United States and other common law
countries is similar. In both, the prosecutor must determine which crime to
charge the person with based on the statutes that define the various crimes.
In common law countries with an infanticide act, if a woman is suspected of
killing her newborn, the government will most likely charge the woman with
infanticide. All of the elements of the act would have to be proved before the
woman is convicted of infanticide. 38 By contrast, the same woman in the
United States would most likely be charged with murder. 39 A charge of
murder may seem to be as "simple" as charging a person with infanticide.
However, because of differences in each state's definition of murder, the
various types of murder within each state, and variations in what must be
proved for each type of murder, it is not very "simple.""''
The variations
between states and variations in what must be proved may account for many
of the women charged with murder being convicted of a lesser crime. 4 '
Another similarity is the need for the defense to bring in evidence of the
mother's disturbed state of mind. However, with the presumption of a
disturbed state of mind in infanticide acts, the "typical" facts found in most
neonaticides is enough evidence of a disturbed state of mind. 42 Without this
same presumption in the United States, evidence of a woman's disturbed state
of mind is used to show insanity. The fact that the killing occurred under the
same circumstances of most neonaticides is not enough. The defense must

138. See, e.g., Regina v. Smith [1976] 32 C.C.C.2d 224 (dismissing the charge of
infanticide after the judge determined that there was reasonable doubt that she acted willfully).
139. See supra pp. 179-81.
140. For example, murder in Massachusetts is statutorily either first or second degree
murder, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 1 (West 1990), or manslaughter which is not defined
in the statute but is determined by case law. Compare Commonwealth v. Hinckley, 294 N.E.2d
562 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973) with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9.1 (West 1993) (statute in Illinois
which defines first degree murder), 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9.2 (West 1993) (statute in Illinois
which defines second degree murder), and 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9.3 (West 1993)
(defines involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide).
141. See supra pp. 181-82.
142. See e.g., Regina v. Salsbury, I Crim. App. 533 (1989) (finding that stress from
pregnancy, immaturity, inability to cope and understand pregnancy, not telling parents due to
fright and not being prepared for the consequences once she had the baby "evidence that the
effects of giving birth to this baby left the balance of your [the mother's] mind disturbed so as
to prevent rational judgment and decisions.").
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bring in expert witnesses and hope that the judge and/or jury accepts the
43
evidence as proof of insanity.
B.

REASON FOR PUNISHING NEONATICIDE

The most blatant difference between neonaticide in common law
countries with an infanticide act and the United States is the punishment the
woman receives if convicted. If a woman is convicted of infanticide,

probation with treatment is the most probable sentence.'" In contrast,
incarceration, sometimes for life, can be the sentence in the United States.' 45
One explanation for the difference in the "punishment" the woman receives
may be the lack of the presumption of a disturbed mind in the United States."'
Another reason for the difference in punishment may be due to the purpose
behind the punishment.
Theories of punishment are generally viewed as either utilitarian or
retributivist.147 It can be argued that all countries, regardless of a specific
infanticide act, practice a form of utilitarianism because they want to prevent
neonaticide. The possibility of imprisonment is considered to be a deterrent
both to society as a whole and to the person convicted of a crime.'48
Rehabilitation can also deter neonaticide. If the person convicted is "cured"
she will not repeat the crime. The presumption of a disturbed state of mind
in infanticide acts easily leads to rehabilitation as a proper form of punishment. 49 This presumption also appears to lead to the conclusion that
deterrence by imprisonment is not applicable. 5 ° In contrast, deterrence by

143. See supra pp. 186-87.
144. See, e.g., Regina v. Lewis, 11 Crim. App. 577 (1989) (reversing a sentence of one
year in prison to three years probation with requirement to receive psychiatric treatment);
Regina v. Szola [1977] 33 C.C.C. 2d 572 (reversing a prison sentence to probation with
requirement that she continue psychiatric assistance).
145. See supra note 77.
146. See, e.g., Regina v. Szola [1977] 33 C.C.C.2d 572 (finding that "jail was no place
for the accused and she would be returned to the community immediately so that as far as
possible her treatment would bring her a cure.") Cf Cekola, supra note 136.
147. DRESSLER, supra note 95 at 8. Utilitarianism is the belief that punishment is
justified if it is expected to reduce crime. Id. at 9. Deterrence and rehabilitation are forms of
utilitarianism. Id. at 10. Retributivism is the belief that a person must be punished for breaking
one of society's laws regardless of whether the punishment results in a reduction of crime. Id.
at 11.
148. Id. at 10.
149. See, e.g., Regina v. Lewis, 11 Crim. App. 577 (1989) (sentencing a woman to
probation with treatment after finding that the woman's responsibility was "substantially
impaired by reason of her abnormality of mind and that abnormality needs treatment.").
150. See, e.g., Regina v. Szola [1977] 33 C.C.C.2d 572 (finding that "nothing was to be
gained in this case from a consideration of deterrence because the accused was very ill and
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imprisonment, regardless of evidence of a disturbed mind, is more often used
in the United States.' 5 ' The use of incarceration in the United States may also
52
be attributed to society's desire to "punish" the person convicted.'
C.

ANALYSIS - IS IT TIME FOR A CHANGE?

Today, the fate of a woman charged with killing her newborn in the
United States cannot be predicted. This unpredictability can be attributed to
differences in each state's definition of homicide, different sentencing
guidelines, defenses available including different definitions of insanity and
differences in people's acceptability of evidence concerning the accused's
state of mind. These differences exist while the goal remains the same;
protect the newborn and "punish" the person responsible. It would appear that
the goal could be reached in a more consistent and fair manner if the states
adopted infanticide statutes similar to those adopted by other common law
countries.
The homicide laws that presently exist were passed to protect society and
to define the appropriate punishment.5 3 Many times laws change as society
becomes more educated. The evidence of the similarity of almost all the
neonaticide killings and the medical evidence that exists today indicates a
change is needed." s A statute which acknowledges today's better understanding of the crime of neonaticide would be similar to those of other common law
countries. For example, it could read, "A female commits neonaticide when
by a willful act or omission she causes the death of her newborn child, if at the

deterrence was obviously not applicable."); Regina v. Salsbury, 11 Crim. App. 533 (1989)
(setting aside a sentence for incarceration after finding that the "mitigating features.., were so
overwhelming that without any hesitation whatever we set this sentence aside and substitute for
it that which we think will best serve the interests not only of this appellant but of society as
well".); Regina v. Lewis, 11 Crim. App. 577 (1989) (changing a sentence of incarceration to
probation after concluding that the prison environment would not alleviate the woman's
problems but would "have deleterious effect upon them."). See also supra note 121.
151. See Oberman, supra note 19, at 94-100 (finding a sentence of imprisonment in
seven of thirteen convictions). See also Wernick 632 N.Y.S2d at 841-42 (finding the
"circumstances of this case do not warrant modification of the defendant's sentence from a term
of imprisonment to probation" after reviewing record which included expert witness testimony
that mother experienced a brief reactive psychosis upon giving birth).
152. Retributists believe that a person must be punished for breaking one of society's
laws regardless if the punishment results in a reduction of crime. DRESSLER, supra note 95, at
11.
153. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 95, at 3.
154. See supra pp. 6-7. Medical evidence includes the physiological changes taking
place during delivery including hormonal changes, see Internight (MSNBC television broadcast,
Jun. 24, 1997), and blood loss. Jacquie Miller and Jeremy Mercer, When a Mother Kills,
OTrAwA CrrzEN, Nov. 17, 1996 at A5.
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time of the act or omission she is not fully recovered from the effects of giving
birth or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent on the birth of the child
and by reason thereof her mind is then disturbed. A finding of guilty is
punishable by a term no greater than 5 years of imprisonment."
The suggested statute includes mitigating factors which society is now
aware of and also addresses the need to have a law criminalizing such
behavior. Deterrence of the crime exists because of the existence of the
statute and the punishment that it allows for. The defense would still have to
present evidence that the woman did have a disturbed state of mind. This
evidence would have to include both the "typical" circumstances surrounding
the killing and expert psychiatric evidence concerning the woman's state of
mind. 155
The statute also allows for the woman to be "punished" by imprisonment
of up to five years. However, the maximum sentence of five years imprisonment allowed in the statute should not eliminate the availability of probation,
with treatment. The availability of treatment as opposed to imprisonment
would help eliminate sentences which are imposed because they are
mandatory, yet not probably the best for the woman or society. 1 6 The
requirement of evidence of a disturbed state of mind, as opposed to an
immediate presumption should also help reduce the risk of extremes such as
57
no imprisonment recently identified in England.1
Several factors may inhibit a legislator to propose such a statute. First,
the neonaticide statute may be viewed as unnecessary because some people
believe "murder is murder."' 8 These individuals are likely to argue that the
crime of neonaticide is already addressed in the existing murder statutes.
However this argument ignores that the states already recognize that "murder
is not murder." The states have recognized that there are different "types" of
murder through the different degrees of murder provided in a state's
statutes. 59 In addition, the statutes identify both aggravating and mitigating
155. Unlike some other common law countries, there should not be a presumption of
disturbed state of mind, but a requirement that the defense prove a disturbed state of mind.
156. See, e.g., Anna Cekola, supra note 136. The article also reported that the judge felt
that if the woman had received probation and treatment after abandoning a previous child three
years earlier "in all likelihood, we wouldn't be in the situation we are in." Id.
157. See supra note 121.
158. For example, criminal defense attorney, Ms. Victoria Toensing, stated (when
discussing neonaticide) "It's murder. And that's been recorded since the beginning of history,
and we shouldn't treat it any differently. It's murder." Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast,
Aug. 4, 1997).
For example, in Illinois, a person could be charged with one of three different
159.
crimes for causing the death of another person depending on the facts of the case. See supra
note 140.
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factors which the judge and/or jury may assess when determining if a person
convicted should receive the death penalty."6 While these aggravating and
mitigating factors do not distinguish between types of murder, they are the
state's attempt to recognize that there are factors, within a specific case, which
must be considered because not all murders are the same.
Many of these same individuals would not agree that new terminology
such as "a disturbed state of mind" should be allowed because the insanity
defense is already available. 6 1 This argument ignores the difficulty in
proving that a person was legally insane. 62 The argument also ignores the
mounting evidence of a "neonaticide syndrome,"' 6 3 the continued conviction
of a mother after evidence of a disturbed state of mind,'" and the extreme
circumstances typically surrounding the killing.'6 5 Patricia Denner's killing
of her newborn illustrates evidence of a "syndrome" and the extreme
circumstances which are generally involved in these cases." 6 Patricia was a
married mother of a four year old who killed her newborn baby after stabbing
it twelve times in the chest and then placing the infant in a sink filled with
water. 67 Patricia had not told anyone of her pregnancy, including her
husband. 6 On the day of the baby's birth she had complained of a "tummy
ache."' 69 There was also evidence that Patricia was going to dispose of the
It is
body.." This evidence included garbage bags, a mop and a pail.'
believed that these items were retrieved by Patricia as she bled to death due
to complications from the birth. 7 2 Dr. Ian Brockington speculates that

160. E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9.1 (West 1993) (listing aggravating and mitigating
factors to be considered when deciding to impose the death penalty).
161. For example, criminal defense attorney, Ms. Victoria Toensing, stated (when
discussing neonaticide). "We charge them with murder, and if they want to bring in the defense
of insanity, then let them ...if they wanted to come in and do the real insanity defense, not one
of your wonderful, creative ones, but the real insanity defense where they had to go it just like
anybody else who was pleading insanity then let the system take its course." Rivera Live
(CNBC television broadcast, Aug. 4, 1997).
162. See supra pp. 186-87 and notes 95-101.
163. Neonaticide syndrome was the term used to describe the evidence of expert
testimony concerning "a type of reactive psychosis following a pathological denial of her
pregnancy," not allowed in at trial. Wernick, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 842 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
164. See supra pp. 186-87.
165. See supra p. 178.
166. Jacquie Miller and Jeremy Mercer, When a Mother Kills, OTTAWA CmZEN, Nov.
17, 1996 at A5.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.

171.
172.

Id.
Id.
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"Patricia killed her child in a rage response to the extreme pain and shock" she
suffered from the birth process." 3 Patricia died in this tragedy so she cannot
be prosecuted. Had Patricia lived, it would be likely that she would be
charged with infanticide because the killing took place in Canada which has
a specific infanticide statute. 4 Had the killing taken place in the United
States and had she lived, Patricia would most likely be charged with murder.
At trial, Patricia would likely claim insanity and would have to try to prove
such defense. Even with the extreme nature of this case and the availability
of expert testimony, it is unlikely such a defense would survive." 5
The argument that terminology such as "a disturbed state of mind"
should not be allowed also ignores the Model Penal Codes provision which
allows for a homicide which would otherwise constitute murder to be
considered manslaughter, if it is committed as a result of "extreme mental or
emotional disturbance which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.
The circumstances surrounding most of the neonaticides as well as the
physiological effects of birth would constitute extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.
A retributionist would also probably find the proposed statute unacceptable because of the possibility that the woman may go "unpunished" if she
receives probation with treatment. 171 This argument is premised on a belief
that probation with treatment is not a form of punishment. While probation
with treatment does not take a person's freedom away by incarceration, it too
should be considered punishment. Probation with treatment does involve
social stigma and an extensive intrusion into the woman's private life. 79 The
retributionist may also find that the proposed statute is not acceptable because
of the possibility of a "lighter" sentence than if the woman was sentenced
under the present homicide statutes. 80 However, society has already

173. Id. Dr. Ian Brockington is a professor at the University of Biringham in England
and an expert in the study of neonaticide. Id.
174. Infanticide, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 233 (1985) (Can.).
175. See supra p. 15.
176. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1974).
177. For example, Dr. Resnick commented that women who deny their pregnancy may
be so psychologically overwhelmed after giving birth they may kill the baby and blood loss can
also lead to physical shock which reduces a woman's ability to think rationally. Carolyn
Colwell, The Pregnancy-Denial Defense Teen's Case Resembles Others Long-Studied by Legal,
Medical Experts, NEWSDAY, Mar. 11, 1991 at 19.
178. See supra note 147.
179. See generally Ania Wilczynski, Mad or Bad? Child-Killers, Gender and the Courts,
BRrrISH J. OF CRIMINOLOGY, June, 22 1997 at 419 (reporting that probation and psychiatric
treatment are not necessarily lenient sentences).
180. See supra note 156.
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acknowledged that different types of crimes and the circumstances pertaining
to each case may warrant either a more harsh form of punishment or a more
lenient form of punishment.'"I
Lastly, some may find treating a women differently than a man would be
treated for the same crime unacceptable." 2 However, the proposed
neonaticide statute applies only to women, not based on stereotypes or
overgeneralizations but on the medical fact that only women have the
capability to bear children. 3 The proposed statute also would not apply to
all women. It would only apply to women who have recently given birth and
who have presented adequate evidence that they had a disturbed state of mind
due to the birth process.
With arguments on both sides what seems most appropriate is to do what
is "fair."'8 4 The vast differences in the treatment of individuals charged and/or
convicted of the same crime is not fair, nor is ignoring the physical and mental
changes that are occurring while giving birth and shortly thereafter. The risk
of allowing each court to determine if, and to what extent, it will allow
evidence of "neonaticide syndrome" will only perpetuate vast differences in
convictions and sentencing. It seems only "fair" that if a person does an act
in a disturbed state of mind that person should be treated, not locked up.
Society is not made better nor protected by imprisoning a person who is not
accountable for her crime. As with most criminals she is likely to be released,
and without treatment the possibility of the same tragedy occurring again
continues to exist.
CONCLUSION

It is without question that death of a newborn is a tragedy. It is also
without question that society has a role in preventing the killing of a newborn
and "punishing" the person who causes the death of a newborn. How society
does these things is not always the same. The difference in the treatment of
neonaticide in the United States and other common law countries is evident.

181. See, e.g., supra p. 181 & n.77.
182. See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 87-90 (1994)
(concluding that a defense such as battered women syndrome is anti-feminist because the
defense denies from women respect for their achievements, the authority over their lives and
perpetuates stereotypes such as women are nurturing of others and of relationships while men
are not).
183. If a man could give birth and experience similar physiological and mental changes
due to the birthing process, he also should be allowed to be convicted under the statute.
184. Black's Law Dictionary defines fair as "Having the qualities of impartiality and
honesty; free from prejudice, favoritism and self-interest." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 595 (6th
ed. 1990).
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The differences can be viewed as extremes; presumption of disturbed state of
mind versus evidence of insanity, probation versus incarceration and treatment
versus punishment. Instead of accepting one of the extremes, the more
acceptable approach is to take the "fair" aspects of each and merge them. This
can be done by adopting a statute similar to other common law countries
which acknowledge the circumstances surrounding a mother who recently
gave birth. The statute cannot allow a presumption of a disturbed state of
mind but must insist on evidence of such a state of mind. The possibility of
probation and treatment instead of a long mandatory prison sentence is also
fair to the convicted and more beneficial, in the end, to society.
JAMES J. DVORAK

